The Roberts Court And Humility

James Fallows has a great post comparing what Obama said about John Roberts during the confirmation process, with what Roberts himself said.  Here's Obama:

I talked to Judge Roberts about this. Judge Roberts...did say he doesn't like bullies and has always viewed the law as a way of evening out the playing field between the strong and the weak.

I was impressed with that statement because I view the law in much the same way. The problem I had is that when I examined Judge Roberts' record and history of public service, it is my personal estimation that he has far more often used his formidable skills on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak. In his work in the White House and the Solicitor General's Office, he seemed to have consistently sided with those who were dismissive of efforts to eradicate the remnants of racial discrimination in our political process. In these same positions, he seemed dismissive of the concerns that it is harder to make it in this world and in this economy when you are a woman rather than a man.

I want to take Judge Roberts at his word that he doesn't like bullies and he sees the law and the court as a means of evening the playing field between the strong and the weak. But given the gravity of the position to which he will undoubtedly ascend and the gravity of the decisions in which he will undoubtedly participate during his tenure on the court, I ultimately have to give more weight to his deeds and the overarching political philosophy that he appears to have shared with those in power than to the assuring words that he provided me in our meeting.

Roberts gave his famous pitch about judicial humility and umpires not writing the rules, but applying them.  Then in yesterday's ruling, in Blueford v. Arkansas, we get this:

 Chief Justice Roberts wrote:

The jurors were never told that once they had a reasonable doubt, they could not rethink the issue. The jury was free to reconsider a greater of­fense, even after considering a lesser one. A simple example illustrates the point. A jury enters the jury room, having just been given these instructions. The foreperson decides that it would make sense to deter­mine the extent of the jurors' agreement before discus­sions begin. Accordingly, she conducts a vote on capital murder, and everyone votes against guilt. She does the same for first-degree murder, and again, everyone votes against guilt. She then calls for a vote on manslaughter, and there is disagreement.

Only then do the jurors engage in a discussion about the circumstances of the crime. While considering the arguments of the other jurors on how the death was caused, one of the jurors starts rethink­ing his own stance on a greater offense. After reflecting on the evidence, he comes to believe that the defendant did knowingly cause the death--satisfying the definition of first-degree murder. At that point, nothing in the instruc­tions prohibits the jury from doing what juries often do: revisit a prior vote. "The very object of the jury system," after all, "is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves." Allen, 164 U. S., at 501.

A single juror's change of mind is all it takes to require the jury to reconsider a greater offense. It was therefore possible for Blueford's jury to revisit the offenses of capital and first-degree murder, notwithstand­ing its earlier votes. And because of that possibility, the foreperson's report prior to the end of deliberations lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses, quite apart from any requirement that a formal verdict be returned or judgment entered (citations omitted).

You follow? The majority simply made up a hypothetical, with no evidence to support it, to eliminate Blueford's double jeopardy protection. The fact that it was theoretically possible that the jury could have changed its mind on the Blueford acquittals (during those 31 minutes of additional deliberations) was enough for Roberts and company to reward prosecutors with a second chance to convict Blueford of capital murder. We've known for decades at the Supreme Court that ties rarely go to criminal defendants. But this was never a tie. The jury forewoman spoke for acquittal. She was clear. And yet her words counted for nothing.

That part about siding with the strong versus the weak is very prescient on the former Senator from Illinois' part.  That is the exact position of the Republican Party at this point in history, and John Roberts isn't currently the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, he's the Cheif Justice of the Republican Party's Supreme Court.  Humility, my ass.  This umpire is on the Yankees' payroll, and he's going to make sure that there is no way in Hell the Yankees ever lose to the Kansas City Royals.  Do you think Roberts would take the prosecution's position if the defendant was Exxon Mobil?  If you do, you've got more confidence in the man's integrity than I do.