New York Magazine:
Every day, the rakers set out from the Brooklyn Army Terminal, where
the Demographics Unit was based, and visited businesses in teams of two.
Their job was to look like any other young men stepping in off the
street.
The routine was almost always the same, whether they were
visiting a restaurant, deli, barbershop, or travel agency. The two
rakers would enter and casually chat with the owner. The first order of
business was to determine his ethnicity and that of the patrons. This
would determine which file the business would go into. A report on
Pakistani locations, for instance, or one on Moroccans. Next, they’d do
what the NYPD called “gauging sentiment.” Were the patrons observant
Muslims? Did they wear traditionally ethnic clothes, like shalwar kameez? Were the women wearing hijabs?
If the Arabic news channel Al Jazeera was playing on the TV,
the police would note it and observe how people were acting. Were they
laughing, smiling, or cheering at reports of U.S. casualties in Iraq and
Afghanistan? Did they talk Middle Eastern politics? If the business
sold extremist literature or CDs, the officers would buy one or two. Was
the owner selling fake I.D.’s or untaxed cigarettes? Police would note
it. If customers could rent time on a computer, police might pay for a
session and look at the computer’s search history. Were people viewing
jihadist videos or searching for bomb-making instructions? Who was
speaking Urdu?
On their way out, the rakers would look at bulletin boards.
Was a rally planned in the neighborhood? The rakers might attend. Was
there a cricket league? The rakers might join. If someone advertised a
room for rent, the cops would tear off a tab with the address or phone
number. It could be a cheap apartment used by a terrorist.
Great, I'm sure that would be useful. So after doing this for years, what did they have to show for it? Not much, according to one of the participants who soured on the program:
But as the years went on, Berdecia’s enthusiasm for the program gave
way to frustration. As a young detective in the Bronx, Berdecia had
worked the streets, building informants and dismantling violent drug
gangs. Yet his rakers spent their days sipping tea in cafés.
The Demographics Unit had thousands of dollars to spend on
meals and expenses so police would look like ordinary customers—costs
known as “cover concealment.” Berdecia felt that his officers could
eavesdrop just as well over a $2 cup of coffee as over a $30 meal, and
he started asking questions about businesses that kept popping up on
expense reports.
One frequent destination was the Kabul Kabob House in
Flushing, Queens, which was owned by a soft-spoken blonde Persian woman
named Shorah Dorudi, who fled Iran after the revolution in 1979. When
Berdecia asked officers whether they suspected a threat that should be
reported up the chain of command, he was told they were conducting
routine follow-up visits. But a look at the reports showed nothing worth
following up.
That’s when Berdecia realized that, in the hunt for terrorists, his detectives gravitated toward the best food.
Occasionally, Berdecia would see receipts for up to $40 at
Middle Eastern sweet shops. Sometimes, the receipts showed detectives
buying a bunch of pastries just before quitting time.
There's a shocker, cops gravitate to the food. The whole article is worth reading. To be honest, I can understand the desire to go undercover and try to glean information, but the real lesson is that there are almost no damn terrorists out there, and pretending there are is a waste of damn time and money. But probably good eating.
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